SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
THE CITY - IT'S LEVEL FOOTING NOW.
By Philip Landau, solicitor, Landau Zeffertt Weir who is pleased to offer
Office Chat users a free initial consultation.
email: 
pl@lawserve.co.uk
Telephone: 020 7357-9494
(web address: http://www.lawserve.co.uk)
Employees have traditionally found it
difficult in proving sex discrimination. Although the Tribunals gave weight
to failings in employer's explanations and procedures when drawing inferences
of unlawful discrimination, the position was far from uniform or clear.
In October 2001, an amendment to the Sex
Discrimination Act came into force (Section 63(a) of the Act) which explicitly
introduces a shifting burden of proof in sex discrimination claims. Essentially,
where the Applicant proves basic facts (such as unequal pay), the Tribunal
can conclude that unlawful discrimination had taken place "in the
absence of an adequate explanation from the Respondent".
In the much publicised and recent Barton
v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite case in April 2003, this was the first
time the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) were faced with the task of
updating the sex discrimination position . Ms Barton had been employed
as an analyst by the City Bank Investec. She brought an equal pay and
sex discrimination claim in respect of differentials in salary, long term
incentive payments, share options and bonus payments made to her and her
two comparatives. The EAT set out fresh guidance in the light of the statutory
changes and confirmed, inter alia:-
(1) It is for the Applicant who claims
sex discrimination to prove, on the balance of probabilities, facts from
which the Tribunal could conclude (in the absence of an adequate explanation)
that the Respondent had committed an act of discrimination.
(2) In deciding whether the Applicant
has proved such facts, that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex
discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination,
even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will not be an intention
but merely based on the assumption that "he or she would not have
fitted in".
(3) The instances of discrimination can
include an evasive or equivocal reply to a Questionnaire (see below).
(4) Where the Applicant has proved such
facts, from which emphasis could be drawn that the Respondent has treated
the Applicant less favourably, on the grounds of sex, then the burden
of proof moves to the Respondent.
(5) It is then for the Respondent to prove
that he did not commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as
having committed that act.
(6) Since the facts necessary to prove
an explanation would normally be in the possession of the Respondent,
a Tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden
of proof. In particular, the Tribunal will need to examine carefully explanations
of failures to deal with Questionnaire procedure and/or any relevant code
of practice.
The EAT further said in the Barton Decision,
in a statement that certainly caught the public eye, that "this court
would certainly wish to make it clear that no Tribunal should be seen
to condone a City bonus culture involving secrecy and/or lack of transparency,
because of the potentially large amounts involved, as a reason for avoiding
equal pay obligations".
The EAT also held that there is an obligation
on Respondents relying on a material factor in equal pay claims to show
an objective justification for any difference in pay, not simply to show
that there was no discriminatory reason.
Such robust and broad guidance from the
EAT on the new burden of proof provisions in the Sex Discrimination Act
means that Barton is likely to be seized upon enthusiastically by lawyers
acting for employees who consider they are the subject of sex discrimination.
On the issue of transparency, the practical
effect of the burden of proof considerations means that an employer operating
a discretionary pay scheme, that is characterised by large differences
in the amounts awarded, (and in which there was no way of showing what
criteria was applied in reaching that decision), will mean that employers
will probably have to disprove discrimination. This in turn is likely
to be a difficult task without documentary evidence.
Philip Landau, Landau Zeffertt Weir
Disclaimer
|
